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serve a worthwhile purpose by providing the general practitioner with
a useful estate planning guide.
I. VALUATION OF PROPERTY IN THE GROSS ESTATE
A number of estate and gift tax sections call for the valuation of
various assets and interests. However, the applicable guidelines for
valuation remain uncertain. Section 2031 and its accompanying regu-
lations set forth the methods for computing property values for estate
tax purposes.' The basic approach of this section is that value be the
equivalent of fair market value.' Despite these provisions, the entire
process has remained a matter of guesswork and has been aptly char-
acterized by one court as "an issue which should frankly be recog-
nized as inherently imprecise and capable of resolution only by a
Solomon-like pronouncement.'
Several decisions rendered in 1974 indicate the contexts in which
valuation is required as well as the difficulties inherent in such a
procedure.' Two cases, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
under § 2012(c) should be only the amount paid by the settlor on the transfer of the
property which was actually included in the decedent's estate. Therefore, H's estate
was entitled to a credit for the full amount of the gift tax paid by W. W's estate was
entitled to a gift tax credit for three-fourths of the gift tax paid by H because that
represented the extent to which the amount of trust principal was includible in her
gross estate. Rev. Rul. 74-522, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 44, at 12.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2031 and Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 to 20.2031-10 (1958).
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 30 F.R. 7708 (June
15, 1965).
3 Morris M. Messing, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967).
Two 1974 decisions involved the utilization of an often controverted valuation
doctrine, the "blockage" rule. In re Estate of Joslyn, 500 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974),
concerned the IRS's use of actual sales figures as evidence of blockage in determining
the value of the stock of a close corporation which was compelled to "go public" in
order to pay off an estate's expenses. The government argued that § 2053 expenses were
included in the blockage element and, therefore, could not be deducted. INT. Ray. CODE
OF 1954, § 2053. However, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the government could not
deprive the taxpayer of the deductions permitted under § 2053 for administrative
expenses by stating that those expenses were part of the blockage element. Id.
In Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), acquiesced in, 1974 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 27, at 8, the issue centered around the fair market value of 425 sculptures created
and owned by Smith at his death. The estate argued that the total value of the
sculptures ($4,284,000) should be discounted by 75% since the only potential buyer
would be a bulk purchaser. The Commissioner, however, argued for full market value
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Company v. United States5 and Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust
Company v. United States,6 focused on the alternative techniques for
valuation of a life estate under § 2013. 7 The purpose underlying the
provision is to prevent repeated estate taxation on the same property
within a short period of time.8 Thus, a credit is provided against the
estate tax where the decedent-transferee received property in a trans-
fer liable to estate taxation within the previous ten years? A tax
credit is also permitted where the transferee predeceased the trans-
feror by no more than two years." The credit is essentially the amount
bearing the same ratio to the total estate tax paid by the transferor
as the value of the property transferred bears to the total value of the
transferor's taxable estate."
Section 2013 is applicable to any beneficial interest in property,
2
thereby including life estates. The Code, however, fails to make ex-
plicit the manner in which a life estate is to be valued for purposes
of § 2013. The regulations merely state that recognized valuation
principles are to be utilized. 3 Generally, actuarial tables" are used
in the computation of the values of the life estates. Courts have
acknowledged that the tables do not always accurately reflect the
of each individual piece. Essentially compromising between the two contentions, the
court ruled that the total value of the works was $2,700,000. Id. For a detailed discus-
sion of the principles underlying blockage, see Part VII, A of this survey, notes 19-33
and accompanying text infra.
Other developments in 1974 regarding valuation include: Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8
(1958), as amended, T.D. 6680, 28 F.R. 10871 (Oct. 10, 1963) (valuation of shares of
open-end investment company to be at "bid" or public redemption price of such
shares, rather than at "asked" or public offering prices); Estate of Minnie Caplan, 33
C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 189 (1974) (valuation of stock sold by decedent to son pursuant
to buy-sell agreement); Estate of Lucretia Eddy Cotchett, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 138
(1974) (valuation of stock in close corporation); Vergeer v. United States, 74-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 12,980, at 84,366 (D. Ore. 1974); (government or "flower" bonds includible
in decedent's gross estate at par, rather than at market value where market value less
than par).
504 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1974).
'368 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1974).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2013.
3 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1954).
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013(a).
I !d.
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013(b).
Iz TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013(e) provides in part: "For purposes of this section,
the term 'property' includes any beneficial interest in property ... " Id.
,2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-4(a) (1973).
" See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958), as amended, T.D. 7077, 35 F.R. 18461 (Dec.
7, 1970).
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value of a life estate in a given case. 5 In the interest of more efficient
administration of the tax laws, however, such potential inequities are
thought to be acceptable."6 But in an "exceptional case,"' 7 departure
from the actuarial tables is allowed.
Both Continental Illinois National Bank and Mercantile-Safe
Deposit involved the question whether the actuarial tables should be
followed. In Continental Illinois National Bank, the decedent-
transferee Josephine Speth died on March 28, 1966, at the age of 75.
She had been bequeathed a life estate in property from her sister
Margaret, who had died on February 21, 1966. At the time of Mar-
garet's death, Josephine suffered from cancer of the colon with metas-
tasis of the liver. The executor of Josephine's estate, in computing the
estate tax, claimed a credit under § 2013 for the amount of federal
estate tax paid by Margaret's estate on the life estate transferred to
Josephine. The amount of the credit was based on the actuarial value
of Josephine's life estate (approximately six years). The Commis-
sioner disallowed the extent of the credit and instead determined the
value of the interest on the basis of Josephine's actual life expect-
ancy. The district court held that the actuarial tables should be fol-
lowed and therefore the executor's computation was correct.
On appeal before the Seventh Circuit, the government argued
that departure from the tables was authorized by a revenue ruling
allowing nonadherence to the tables in situations where the life ten-
ant is afflicted with an incurable disease and can survive for only a
brief period of time. 8 The government argued that in the ruling,
"brief' was used in a relative sense rather than in an absolute one.
Thus, departure from the tables would be justified, for example,
where a person with a fatal disease had an actuarial life expectancy
" See, e.g., Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929); McMurtry
v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953).
26 See, e.g., Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1971).
"7 Estate of Lion v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 56, 62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
870 (1971).
IS Rev. Rul. 307, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 429, provides in part:
[I]f it is known on the valuation date that a life tenant is afflicted
with a fatal and incurable disease in its advanced stages, and that he
cannot survive for more than a brief period of time, the value of the
life or remainder interest should be determined by reference to such
known facts. ...
In defense of the district court's ruling, the taxpayer contended that the revenue
ruling was invalid. The court, however, found it unnecessary to reach this issue as it
concluded that, even if valid, the ruling was not applicable to the instant case. 504
F.2d at 590.
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of 25 years and, therefore, by comparison a brief actual life expect-
ancy. 19
The court concluded that brief was an absolute, rather than a
relative term, thereby rejecting the government's argument. How-
ever, it noted that medical testimony as to Josephine's actual life
expectancy was inconclusive. It was possible, although not likely,
that she could live for an additional two years. Also, Josephine had
none of the clinical signs associated with liver metastasis which
would indicate imminent death. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that a series of cases allowed departure from the tables but pointed
out that they generally involved life tenants with maximum life ex-
pectancies of one year or less.2 0 Given the presumption of applicabil-
ity accorded to the tables and the uncertainties concerning Jose-
phine's life expectancy, the court determined that the case was not
sufficiently exceptional to justify valuation based on actual rather
than actuarial expectancies.
Similarly, the court in Mercantile-Safe Deposit held that the ac-
tuarial tables should be followed. Norma J. Bremmer was given a life
estate in a residuary trust created by her husband. Mrs. Bremmer
died at the age of 67 on October 29, 1965, 26 days after the death of
her husband. Again, the government argued that the tables should
not be utilized in determining the tax credit allowable under § 2013.
The court initially rejected the taxpayer's motion for summary judg-
ment, concluding that the tables were not to be applied automati-
cally. The tables, however, were more than merely evidentiary mate-
rials and were to be utilized unless a party could show the case to be
an "exceptional" one.2'
it Id.
2 See, e.g., Estate of John P. Hoelzel, 28 T.C. 384 (1957); Estate of James W.
Douglas, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 347 (1953); Estate of T. G. Hendrick, 9 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 581 (1950); Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760, 765 (1949); Estate of Nellie H.
Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948). See also Estate of Lion v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 56
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (departure from tables allowed in valuing
life interest of wife who had died simultaneously with husband in airplane crash). But
see Estate of Chauncey Stillman, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 478 (1965) (departure not
allowed where life tenant had incurable disease of myeloma but experts disagreed as
to her actual life expectancy).
The Seventh Circuit appeared to suggest a one-year cut-off in permitting non-
adherence to the tables. It pointed out that the revenue ruling was predicated on a
factual situation wherein the life tenant, at the death of the transferor, was known to
be unable to survive for more than one year. Conversely, one reason offered by the court
to support its determination that the present case was not an "exceptional" one was
that the medical testimony showed the possibility of Josephine surviving for more than
one year. 504 F.2d at 592-93.
21 368 F. Supp. at 746.
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The court found that the facts in the present case were not ade-
quate to justify departure from the tables. During the trial, Mrs.
Bremmer's personal physician testified that he was unable to make
a specific estimate as to her actual life expectancy. The evidence did
suggest that she had a drinking problem which had resulted in her
poor health for a long period of time and in several hospitalizations.
However, the actual cause of her death was a stroke, unrelated to her
alocholic tendencies. The court determined that the evidence was
inadequate to obviate the necessity of utilization of the actuarial
tables." As the Seventh Circuit had done in Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank, the federal district court in Mercantile-Safe Deposit
held that the revenue ruling permitting deviation from the tables
was inapplicable to the case at bar. There was no convincing proof
that Mrs. Bremmer could be anticipated to have a drastically shorter
life than predicted in the actuarial tables.
Use of the actuarial tables was examined with respect to another
valuation problem in 1974. In Karlson v. Commission,4 the court
considered the valuation of a decedent's remainder interest in the
computation of her estate tax liability. The decedent, Vivian G.
O'Donnell, died in 1968. Under the will of her father, the decedent
and her brother were given remainders following a life estate be-
queathed to their mother, Nancy S. Karlson. At the time of dece-
dent's death, Mrs. Karlson was 77 years old.
After the IRS's determination that the decedent's remainder
should be assessed at a value of $68,041.81, the executor of the estate
moved for summary judgment to disallow inclusion of the interest in
her estate. First, the estate offered the equitable argument that an
estate should not be required to pay a tax based on a remainder
interest if such a tax exceeded the liquid assets available to the es-
tate. The court, however, dismissed this contention as simply "irrele-
vant."5
In addition, and more fundamentally, the estate claimed that the
value of the remainder was unascertainable since the holder of the life
estate had been given an unlimited power of invasion over the corpus.
Therefore, since valuation was impossible, the remainder should be
excluded from the decedent's estate. The plaintiff relied on a series
2 Id. at 743.
See note 18 supra.
74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,014, at 85,799 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
25 Id. at 85,800.
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of cases " holding that a charitable deduction for the present value of
a charitable remainder was not allowable when the life tenant's power
of invasion was not limited by an objective standard.
The government, however, argued that the estate was attempting
to utilize an erroneous standard, the standard used for deductions
from a gross estate rather than for valuation of inclusions in the gross
estate. The court agreed that the ascertainable standard test used in
conjunction with charitable remainders was inapplicable to the pres-
ent case. Nevertheless, the court indicated a willingness to consider
the effect of the life tenant's power to diminish the value of the
remainder interest. It rejected the Commissioner's use of the ac-
tuarial tables since such tables considered only the life expectancy
of the life tenant and not her right to invade the corpus. Instead, the
court determined that the more general standard of the fair market
values of the remainder interest should be utilized. Valuation, the
court ruled, "must be made with reference to all relevant facts, in-
cluding those which bear on the likelihood, that the life beneficiary
will actually invade the corpus." The court acknowledged that the
value of the remainder interest was likely to be small. However, such
insubstantiality did not demonstrate that the remainder was pres-
ently unascertainable. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment was denied.
As a general matter, therefore, the courts in 1974 have done little
to help clarify the status of the actuarial tables provided by the
regulations under § 20.2031-7. The Continental Illinois National
Bank decision has apparently made it more difficult to establish the
"exceptional" case that warrants departure from the tables. On the
other hand, in the Karlson case, a district court has ruled that the
valuation of a remainder interest for the purpose of federal estate
taxation should not be governed by the tables where discretionary
power to decrease that interest for the benefit of a life tenant exists.
2 See, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943); Ithaca
Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
21 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958), as amended, T.D. 7077, 35 F.R. 18461 (Dec. 4,
1970).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 30 F.R. 7708 (June
15, 1965).
74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,014, at 85,801 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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